CPPIB U.S.A. general partner Q1 2008 performance numbers
On Monday we published the Q1 results for the ever-diminishing number of Canadian GPs (”CPPIB Canadian general partner Q1 2008 performance numbers“, August 25-08) that can still count the $127.7 billion CPP Investment Board as a limited partner. Here are the U.S. results, as of March 31, 2008.
The one thing that will jump out at you is that, almost to a “T”, the more recent the commitment, the worse the return figure will be. Not that one should be surprised that a 2005 or 2006 deal hasn’t yet grown in equity value, but the huge jump in CPPIB commitments on successive funds also speaks to the dynamic that went on this decade in the PE industry.
The figures that follow cover four categories: CPPIB’s commitment, paid-in-capital (which tells you how much of the fund is invested in deals and/or drawn to pay management fees) reported value, and reported value + distributions (which tells you what the notional simple return of the fund is against the paid-in-capital figure). That figure is based in large part on what the manager believes the portfolio is worth as at March 31, 2008, subject to GAAP fair value accounting. The year in the brackets reflects the year that the investment commitment was made by CPPIB. MM equals millions:
Apollo Investment Fund V (2002): $150MM, $130.8 (87%), $119.1MM, $462.5MM; +253.6%
Apollo VI (2005): $419.3MM, $264.4MM (63%), $297MM, $351.3MM; +32.9%
Apollo VII (2007): $600MM, no capital drawn for investments
Blackstone Capital Partners IV (2002): $200MM, $142.2MM (71%), $146.2MM, $386.2MM; +172%
Blackstone Capital Partners V (2005): $410.0MM, $263.9MM (64%), $265.3MM, $292.2MM; +10.7%
Carlyle Venture Partners II (2002): $60MM, $62.3MM (104%), $44MM, $68.1MM; +9.3%
CSFB Mid Market Opportunity Fund (2003): $140MM, $93.1MM (67%), $92.6MM, $106.8MM; +14.7%
CSFB Mid Market Opportunity Fund II (2005): $300MM, $71.3MM (24%), $63.8MM, $71.4MM; +0.1%
CSFB Mid Market Opportunity Fund III (2007): $400MM, $0.2MM, $0.1MM, $0.1MM; nmf
Goldman Sachs Vintage Fund IV (2006): $200MM, $74.6MM (37.3%), $79.4MM, $82.9MM; +11.1%
Heartland Industrial Partners (2001): $150MM, $140.4MM (94%), $30.4MM, $37.9MM; -73%
Hellman & Friedman Capital Partners V (2004): $75MM, $67.4MM (90%), $81MM, $136.6MM; +103%
Hellman & Friedman Capital Partners VI (2006): $400MM, $196.7MM (49%), $201.3MM, $201.3MM; +2.3%
JP Morgan Partners Global Investors (2001): $217.6MM, $198.1MM (91%), $139.3MM, $269.1MM; 35.8% increase
JP Morgan Partners Global Investors (Selldown) II (2006): $317.4MM, $298.6MM (94%), $214.2MM, $410.7MM; +38.4% increase
KKR Millenium Fund (2002): $300MM, $275.2MM (92%), $266.2MM, $447.7MM; +62.7%
Lehman Brothers Venture Partners 2003 (2003): $75MM, $65.6MM (88%), $68.9MM, $77.1MM; +17.5%
MidOcean Partners (2003): $273.1MM, $256.1MM (94%), $56.3MM, $563.1MM; +119.9%
Paul Capital Holdings (2002): $81MM, $73.1MM (90%), $24.1MM, $159.7MM; +119%
Paul Capital Holdings II (2004): $120MM, $102.7MM (86%), $95.1MM, $229.7MM; +124%
Paul Capital Partners VII (2001): $90MM, $85.3MM (95%), $35.3MM, $139.8MM; +64%
Paul Capital Partners VIII (2004): $100MM, $71.2MM (71%), $74.4MM, $101.8MM; +43%
Paul Capital Partners IX (2007): $100MM, $9.5MM (9.5%), $9.1MM, $9.1MM; -4%
Paul Capital Top Tier II (2002): $96MM, $70.1MM (73%), $66.1MM, $77.3MM; +10%
Paul Capital Top Tier Investments III (2005): $160MM, $54.4MM (34%), $55.8MM, $57.8MM; +6.3%
Performance Venture Capital (2005): $185MM, $46.5MM (25%), $45.9MM, $52.5MM; +13%
Providence Equity Partners VI (2006): $400MM, $150.3 (38%), $144.3MM, $144.3MM; -4%
Silver Lake Partners II (2004): $100MM, $85.7MM (86%), $99.8MM, $123.7MM; +44%
Silver Lake Partners III (2006): $500MM; $59.5MM (12%), $54.2MM, $54.2MM -9%
Thomas Weisel Partners GGP II (2003): $50MM, $40.7MM (81%), $38.7MM, $56.4MM; +38.6%
TPG Partners IV (2003): $100MM, $90.4MM (90%), $107.1MM, $164.2MM; +81.6%
TPG Partners V (2006): $500MM, $386.1MM (77%), $378.7MM, $385.9MM; -0.1%
TPG VI (2008): $750MM, no capital drawn for investments
Welsh, Carson, Anderson & Stowe X (2005): $200MM, $138MM (69%), $156.7MM, $156.7MM; +14%
MRM
Wow, I knew Heartland was bad, but that is terrible. It just demonstrates how bad things are within the automotive sector.