CPPIB U.S.A. general partner Q3 2009 performance numbers

Now that they’ve cleaned up the data errors (see prior post “Did CPPIB really make US$4.2B on TPG IV?” Feb 17-10), we can analyze the figures. This review covers the high profile U.S. GPs that count the CPP Investment Board as a direct limited partner (as at September 2009).

Some of the more notable large moves between Q2 2008, Q1 2009 and Q3 2009 are below (vintage year of the fund is in brackets). That’s but 15 months of a fund’s life, but weren’t they a momentous 15!:

– Apollo Inv. Fund V (2002) reported a return drop from 252% to 97%; holding now at +99%

– Apollo VI (2005), with 105% drawn, saw it’s 26.4% positive return turn into a negative 36%, and has recovered to a positive 1%

-Blackstone IV (2002)’s return fell from 171.6% to 95%; now up 108%

-Blackstone V (2005)’s return fell from 7.7% to a loss of 28%; now down 26% with 82% drawn

– First Reserve XII has already put out 30% of their 2008-vintage year fund, and the carrying value is down 32% so far

– KKR Millenium Fund (2002)’s return dropped from 63.3% to 15%; now +30%

– KKR 2006 is 76% drawn, and a positive 5% return became a negative 27%, and has risen to negative 10%

– MidOcean Partners’ #II (2005) fund has still not closed a single deal since they raised their capital 4 years ago, and they’ve only drawn the smallest amount of mgmt. fees

– Providence’s VI (2006) fund is now 53% drawn, but went from being flat to down 28%; now down 19%

– TPG Partners IV (2003)’s return dropped from +80.8% to +18.7%; now +29% with 107% drawn

– TPG Partners V (2006) is drawn at 84% of CPPIB’s US$500 million, and they went from being down 5.6% to down 35%; now down 29%. This fund is the one with the unfortunate investment experience in WaMu bank

The figures that follow cover four categories: CPPIB’s commitment, paid-in-capital (which tells you how much of the fund is invested in deals and/or drawn to pay management fees), reported value, and reported value + distributions (which tells you what the notional simple return of the fund is against the paid-in-capital figure). That figure is based in large part on what the manager believes the portfolio is worth as at Sept. 30, 2009, subject to GAAP fair value accounting. The year in the brackets reflects the year that the investment commitment was made by CPPIB. MM equals millions:

Apollo Investment Fund V (2002): $150MM, $217.3 (145%), $90MM, $433.4MM; +99%

Apollo VI (2005): $400MM, $434.6MM (109%), $340MM, $438.8MM; +1%

Apollo VII (2007): $600MM, $173.2MM (29%), $135.7MM, $186.3MM; +8%

Blackstone Capital Partners IV (2002): $185MM, $192.1MM (104%), $146.7MM, $399.1MM; +108%

Blackstone Capital Partners V (2005): $410MM, $338.1MM (82%), $214MM, $250.2MM; -26%

Blackstone Capital Partners VI (2008): $500MM, $0, $0, $0

Carlyle Venture Partners II (2002): $60MM, $71.9MM (120%), $34.3MM, $71.1MM; -1.0%

CCMP Capital Investors II (2006): $367.7MM, $109.5MM (30%), $77.8MM, $77.9MM (-29%)

CSFB Mid Market Opportunity Fund (2003): $140MM, $118.9MM (85%), $106.6MM, $136.1MM; +14%

CSFB Mid Market Opportunity Fund II (2005): $300MM, $144.9MM (48%), $127.9MM, $148.5MM; +2%

CSFB Mid Market Opportunity Fund III (2007): $400MM, $68.5MM (17%), $59.9MM, $62.8MM; -8%

First Reserve Fund XI (2006): $300MM, $241.9MM (81%), $215.3MM, $231.6MM; -4%

First Reserve Fund XII (2008): $500MM, $152MM (30%), $103.7MM, $103.7MM; -32%

Goldman Sachs Vintage Fund IV (2006): $200MM, $132MM (66%), $92.1MM, $104.2MM; -21%

Goldman Sachs Vintage Fund V (2008): $300MM, $66M (22%), $61MM, $61MM; -8%

Heartland Industrial Partners (2001): $150MM, $140.4MM (94%), $23MM, $30.5MM; -78%

Hellman & Friedman Capital Partners V (2004): $75MM, $67.5MM (90%), $67.3MM, $130MM; +93%

Hellman & Friedman Capital Partners VI (2006): $400MM, $255.7MM (64%), $237.7MM, $244.7MM; -4%

JP Morgan Partners Global Investors (2001): $175MM, $167.8MM (96%), $80.5MM, $226.8MM; +35%

KKR Millenium Fund (2002): $282.5MM, $329.6MM (117%), $242.3MM, $427.9MM; +30%

KKR 2006 (2006): $475MM, $359.4MM (76%), $317.2MM, $323.7MM; -10%

Lightyear Fund II (2006): $100MM, $59.2MM (59%), $51.8MM, $53MM; -10%

MidOcean Partners (2003): $273.1MM, $260.5MM (95%), $36.7MM, $523MM; +115%

MidOcean Partners II (2005): $100MM, $0.8MM (1%), $0.1MM, $0.1MM; nmf%

New Mountain Partners III (2007): $200MM, $54.3MM (27%), $44.1MM, $49.8MM; -8%

Paul Capital Holdings II (2004): $120MM, $106.8MM (89%), $69MM, $223MM; +109%

Paul Capital Partners VII (2001): $90MM, $86.3MM (96%), $22.7MM, $133.2MM; +54%

Paul Capital Partners VIII (2004): $100MM, $89.8MM (90%), $61.2MM, $106.8MM; +19%

Paul Capital Partners IX (2007): $100MM, $42MM (42%), $34.1MM, $36.5MM; -13%

Paul Capital Top Tier II (2002): $96MM, $83.6MM (87%), $62.2MM, $78.8MM; -6%

Paul Capital Top Tier Investments III (2005): $160MM, $92.8MM (58%), $84.3MM, $91.4MM; -2%

Performance Venture Capital (2005): $185MM, $97.5MM (53%), $78.8MM, $91.2MM; -6%

Providence Equity Partners VI (2006): $400MM, $213.5MM (53%), $162.5MM, $172.6MM; -19%

Resolute Fund II (2007): $200MM, $48.3MM (24%), $38MM, $38.1MM; -21%

Silver Lake Partners II (2004): $100MM, $93.7MM (94%), $69.2MM, $105.6MM; +13%

Silver Lake Partners III (2006): $500MM; $160.5MM (32%), $133.1MM, $134.1MM -16%

Thomas H. Lee Parallel Fund VI (2006): $250MM, $129.8MM (52%), $115.5MM, $116MM; -11%

Thomas Weisel Partners GGP II (2003): $50MM, $46MM (92%), $34.3MM, $53.9MM; +17%

TPG Partners IV (2003): $100MM, $106.8MM (107%), $75.6MM, $137.7MM; +29%

TPG Partners V (2006): $500MM, $421.8MM (84%), $218.8MM, $299.4MM; -29%

TPG VI (2008): $750MM, $79.5MM (11%), $47.5MM, $47.5MM; -40%

Welsh, Carson, Anderson & Stowe X (2005): $200MM, $170MM (85%), $161MM, $161MM; -5%

Welsh, Carson, Anderson & Stowe XI (2008): $300MM, $6.8 (2%), $0.4MM, $0.4MM; -94%

Tomorrow I’ll once again share the total return for the program plus the big ticket secret: CPP Investment Board’s unfunded liability for their entire private equity program….

MRM