CPPIB U.S.A. general partner Q2 2010 performance numbers

This is really late, and I’m sorry for that. We’ve been a trifle busy. Here are the stats for the high profile U.S. GPs that count the CPP Investment Board as a direct limited partner (as at June ’10).

Some of the more notable large moves between Q2 2008, Q1 2009 and Q2 2010 are below (vintage year of the fund is in brackets):

– Apollo Inv. Fund V (2002) reported a return drop from 252% to 97%; holding now at +105%

– Apollo VI (2005), with 115% drawn, saw its 26.4% positive return turn into a negative 36%, and has recovered to a positive 11%

– Apollo VII (2007) has drawn 54%, and is up 11%

-Blackstone IV (2002)’s return fell from +171.6% to 95%; now up 116%

-Blackstone V (2005)’s return fell from +7.7% to a loss of 28%; now down 4% with 89% drawn

– Blackstone VI (2008) is still undrawn on CPPIB’ss US$500MM commitment, unlike Apollo’s 2007/08 vintage fund

– First Reserve XII (2008) has put out 45% of their 2008-vintage year fund, and the carrying value is down 32%

– KKR Millenium Fund (2002)’ss return dropped from 63.3% to 15%; now +42%

– KKR 2006 is 77% drawn, and a positive 5% return became a negative 27%, and has risen to positive 10%

– MidOcean Partners’s #II (2005) fund has still not closed a single deal since they raised their capital 5 years ago

– Providence’s VI (2006) fund is now 69% drawn, but went from being flat to down 28%; now down 6%

– TPG Partners IV (2003)’s return dropped from +80.8% to +18.7%; now +43% with 106% drawn

– TPG Partners V (2006) is drawn at 96% of CPPIB’s US$500 million, and they went from being down 5.6% to down 35%; now down 20%. This fund is the one with the unfortunate investment experience in WaMu bank

– TPG Partners VI (2008) is drawn at 21% of CPPIB’s US$750 million, and the fund is down 18%, although it is very early days

The figures that follow cover four categories: CPPIB’s commitment, paid-in-capital (which tells you how much of the fund is invested in deals and/or drawn to pay management fees), reported value, and reported value + distributions (which tells you what the notional simple return of the fund is against the paid-in-capital figure). That figure is based in large part on what the manager believes the portfolio is worth as at June 30, 2010, subject to GAAP fair value accounting. The year in the brackets reflects the year that the investment commitment was made by CPPIB. MM equals millions:

Apollo Fund V (2002): $150MM, $217.3 (145%), $62.6MM, $445.2MM; +105%

Apollo VI (2005): $400MM, $460.7MM (115%), $379.1MM, $512.9MM; +11%

Apollo VII (2007): $600MM, $323.5MM (54%), $250.7MM, $359.1MM; +11%

Blackstone Capital Partners IV (2002): $185MM, $198MM (107%), $135.3MM, $427.7MM; +116%

Blackstone Capital Partners V (2005): $410MM, $363.8MM (89%), $308.3MM, $348.1MM; -4%

Blackstone Capital Partners VI (2008): $500MM, $0, $0, $0

Carlyle Venture Partners II (2002): $60MM, $74.7MM (125%), $25.8MM, $74.3MM; -1%

CCMP Capital Investors II (2006): $367.7MM, $220MM (60%), $193.9MM, $193.9MM (-12%)

CSFB Mid Market Opportunity Fund (2003): $140MM, $126.3MM (90%), $113.4MM, $151.1MM; +20%

CSFB Mid Market Opportunity Fund II (2005): $300MM, $175.2MM (58%), $169.6MM, $193.3MM; +10%

CSFB Mid Market Opportunity Fund III (2007): $400MM, $94.6MM (24%), $86.8MM, $93.4MM; -1%

First Reserve Fund XI (2006): $300MM, $242.9MM (81%), $196.9MM, $225.4MM; -7%

First Reserve Fund XII (2008): $500MM, $222.6MM (45%), $137.1MM, $151.2MM; -32%

Goldman Sachs Vintage Fund IV (2006): $200MM, $160.8MM (80%), $135.7MM, $156.2MM; -3%

Goldman Sachs Vintage Fund V (2008): $300MM, $76.2M (25%), $77.1MM, $80.9MM; +6%

Heartland Industrial Partners (2001): $150MM, $145.9MM (97%), $37.3MM, $45MM; -69%

Hellman & Friedman Capital Partners V (2004): $75MM, $66.4MM (89%), $73.1MM, $142.3MM; +114%

Hellman & Friedman Capital Partners VI (2006): $400MM, $303.7MM (76%), $321.3MM, $349.9MM; +15%

Hellman & Friedman Capital Partners VII (2009): $600MM, $0MM (0%), $0MM, $0MM; +0%

JP Morgan Partners Global Investors (2001): $175MM, $167.7MM (96%), $79.4MM, $232.6MM; +39%

KKR Millenium Fund (2002): $282.5MM, $329.6MM (117%), $264MM, $466.6MM; +42%

KKR 2006 (2006): $475MM, $371.1MM (78%), $376.2MM, $407.2MM; +10%

Lightyear Fund II (2006): $100MM, $80.2MM (80%), $81.2MM, $82.4MM; +3%

MidOcean Partners (2003): $273.1MM, $261.7MM (96%), $30.3MM, $555.8MM; +112%

MidOcean Partners II (2005): $100MM, $1MM (1%), $0.2MM, $0.2MM; nmf%

New Mountain Partners III (2007): $200MM, $76.1MM (38%), $60.1MM, $72.8MM; -4%

Paul Capital Holdings II (2004): $120MM, $107.6MM (90%), $64.5MM, $232.3MM; +116%

Paul Capital Partners VII (2001): $90MM, $87.1MM (97%), $22.4MM, $135.7MM; +56%

Paul Capital Partners VIII (2004): $100MM, $93.7MM (94%), $57.8MM, $115.1MM; +23%

Paul Capital Partners IX (2007): $100MM, $51MM (51%), $42.6MM, $47.2MM; -7%

Paul Capital Top Tier II (2002): $96MM, $85.5MM (89%), $65.8MM, $85.2MM; -0%

Paul Capital Top Tier Investments III (2005): $160MM, $112MM (70%), $105.4MM, $118.6MM; +6%

Performance Venture Capital (2005): $185MM, $105.5MM (57%), $89.1MM, $102MM; -3%

Providence Equity Partners VI (2006): $400MM, $274.6MM (69%), $238.3MM, $257.8MM; -6%

Resolute Fund II (2007): $200MM, $63.2MM (32%), $56.6MM, $58MM; -8%

Silver Lake Partners II (2004): $100MM, $95.8MM (96%), $83.5MM, $123.6MM; +29%

Silver Lake Partners III (2006): $500MM; $214.1MM (42.8%), $199.5MM, $218.6MM; +2%

Thomas H. Lee Parallel Fund VI (2006): $250MM, $129.8MM (52%), $116.8MM, $120.1MM; -7%

Thomas Weisel Partners GGP II (2003): $50MM, $46MM (92%), $34.2MM, $53.9MM; +17%

TPG Partners IV (2003): $100MM, $105.8MM (106%), $75.8MM, $150.9MM; +43%

TPG Partners V (2006): $500MM, $479.5MM (96%), $295.5MM, $381.8MM; -20%

TPG VI (2008): $750MM, $159.9MM (21%), $123.4MM, $131.4MM; -18%

Welsh, Carson, Anderson & Stowe X (2005): $200MM, $174MM (87%), $168.9MM, $175.5MM; +1%

Welsh, Carson, Anderson & Stowe XI (2008): $300MM, $48.7 (16%), $39.3MM, $39.3MM; -19%

MRM